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SCOURING MUDDIED WATERS:
TOWARDS CLARIFYING THE CFPB 's
"ABUSIVE" PRACTICES
Michael R. Faz*
While this Article was pending publication, several events
unfolded altering the landscape of the abusive power. As a
preliminary note, during the pendency of publication several
dispositions changed-eitherby court order or agreement between
the parties.
Next, in June 2019, Director Kraninger kicked off the
Bureau's symposium series by holding an open forum over the
abusive power. The symposium consisted of two panels: one
focusing on policy, composed of law professors, and one focusing on
practicalapplication, comprised of practicing attorneys in private
and government practice. Both panels were intellectually
stimulating and presented diverging views. In the policy panel,
major disagreement arose in two areas: (1) whether the abusive
prong required consumerharm and (2) whether abusive contains a
scienter requirement. Further, the practicalpanel debated on the
issue of whether the abusive power needs clarificationright now.
The panel did not come to an agreement, however, it made one
thing clear: there is widespread disagreement on whether
rulemaking is necessary to clarify the abusive power. This Article
will address that disagreement.
Finally, on September 7, 2019, Kraninger brought her first
abusive (with deceptive) action against Certified Forensic Loan
Auditors, LLC. This case shows Kraninger'swillingness to use the
abusive power. This action, though, leaves open the question of
* Michael R. Faz, Juris Doctor Candidate 2020, University of Nebraska
College of Law; B.A., 2017, Texas A&M University-Commerce. First and
foremost, the author thanks his parents, Kim and Jesus Solis, for their
guidance and support. Further, the author thanks Professor Catherine Wilson
at the University of Nebraska College of Law for her assistance in this Article
and for her mentorship in cultivating the author's interest in financial
regulation and related areas.
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whether she should, as a practicalmatter, continue to allow abusive
allegationswithoutfurtherclarification.Thus, the era ofregulation
by enforcement continues.
INTRODUCTION
The power of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(the "CFPB" or "Bureau") to act against "abusive" conduct is
infinite, yet the meaning of the word abusive is vague. Abusive is
a catchall term that the Bureau uses to impose penalties upon
unsuspecting businesses and individuals in the financial industry.
The only method of discerning whether conduct is abusive is
through an analysis of prior enforcement actions, which are rare.
There is no guidance or rule-businesses must determine for
themselves whether their conduct is abusive. If they misjudge or
rectify their actions too late, they may face the thrust of the CFPB
and their massive penalties. This era of regulation by enforcement
must end.
On October 15, 2018, then-acting CFPB Director Mick
Mulvaney ("Mulvaney") announced that the Bureau's era of
"regulation by enforcement" concerning the abusive power "is
done."' Mulvaney, though, did little to clarify the power-he failed
to initiate rulemaking, or even guidance, on the topic. Before
leaving, Mulvaney announced his intent to request information
regarding whether the CFPB should initiate rulemaking to clarify
the power-which is attracting both support and fierce opposition
from businesses and individuals. 2
The means to bringing clarity is unclear. Mulvaney,
himself, even commented: "I'm not sure we know how to define
abusive."3 His comments are typical. While some legal scholars
and the financial community support clarifying the abusive power,
1 See Richard J. Andreano, Jr., Regulation by Enforcement is Dead,
CONSUMER

FIN.

MONITOR

(Oct.

15,

2018),

https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/10/15/regulation-byenforcement-is-dead; Katie Grzechnik Neill, Mulvaney: BCGP Intends to
Define "Abusive" of UDAAP, INSIDE ARM (Oct. 16, 2018, 12:00:00 PM),
https://www.insidearm.com/news/00044416-mulvaney-bcfp-define-udaapsabusive-new-r/; Mike Sorohan, Mulvaney: Regulation by Enforcement is
Done, MORTGAGE BANKERS Ass'N NEwsLINK (Oct. 16, 2018),
https://www.mba.org/mba-newslinks/2018/october/mba-newslinktuesdayam-1 0-1 6-18/mulvaney-regulation-by-enforcement-is-done.
2 Infra Part IV.
3 Sorohan, supra note 1.

2019

Scouring Muddied Waters

47

many remain unsure whether rulemaking is necessary and, if it is
considered necessary, those individuals continue to disagree on the
scope of a potential rule. This Article intends to delve into the
various views regarding rulemaking and the abusive power. First,
Part II will present the problem. Next, Part III Article will
categorize the Bureau's abusive enforcement actions and delve
into the scope of the power. Thereafter, Part IV will lay out the
diverging views on initiating rulemaking to clarify the power.
Finally, Part V and VI will provide recommendations on whether
the Bureau should initiate rulemaking and, if so, the necessary
contents of such a rule.
BACKGROUND
In response to the financial crisis of the late-2000s, Congress
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank") establishing the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection "to implement and, where
applicable, enforce Federal consumer financial law consistently for
the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access to markets
for consumer financial products and services and that markets for
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and
competitive." 4 To accomplish such a task, the Bureau derives its
power to "regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial
products or services under the Federal consumer financial law"
from (1) the Bureau's authority under the Consumer Financial
Protection Act and (2) preexisting laws transferred to the Bureau
such as the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act.5
A. Unfair, Deceptive, and Abusive Acts or Practices
Among the powers granted to the Bureau are the powers to
act to prevent and punish entities engaged in "unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts or practices" ("UDAAP"), thereby subjecting a
business or individual to civil penalties. 6 Before the CFPB's
creation, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") possessed
authority to prevent and punish unfair and deceptive practices. 7
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491(a), 5511(a) (2010).
5 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a); see also MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL
REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 581 (Saul Levmore et al., eds., 2nd ed. 2018).
6 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2010).
7 Joshua L. Roquemore, The CFPB's Ambiguous "Abusive" Standard,
4
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Due to a statutory definition and an extensive enforcement and
adjudicative history, individuals and businesses are generally well
aware of the practices and conduct these terms entail.8 Under
Dodd-Frank, the Bureau has the power to declare a practice unfair
when:
(A) the act or practice causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers; and (B) such substantial injury
benefits
countervailing
by
is
not outweighed
9
to consumers or to competition.
Accordingly, the unfair standard has three parts: (1) the
consumer must sustain a substantial economic injury, (2) the
consumer cannot reasonably avoid the . injury, and (3)
countervailing benefits to the consumer or competition must not
outweigh the injury.' 0 Further, while deceptive does not possess a
statutory definition, there is extensive enforcement history and
CFPB guidance to determine the types of acts and practices under
the prohibition." An act or practice is deceptive when:
(1) The representation,omission, act, or practicemisleads
or is likely to mislead the consumer; (2) The consumer's
interpretation of the representation, omission, act, or
practice is reasonable under the circumstances; and (3)
The misleading representation, omission, act, or practice
is material.' 2

22 N.C. BANKING INST. 191, 191 (2018).
8 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2016) (defining unfair and deceptive
under the FTC and supplying examples of conduct that it entails); 12 U.S.C.
§ 5531(c) (2010) (defining unfair under Dodd-Frank).
9 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c).
10 Examples of unfair conduct includes refusing to release a lien after a
consumer makes final payment on a mortgage, dishonoring credit card
convenience checks without notice, and processing payments for companies
engaged in fraudulent activities. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB

Consumer Laws and Regulations: Unfair, Deceptive, or Abusive Acts or
2012),
(October
Practices
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/102012_cfpbunfairdeceptive-abusive-acts-practices-udaapsprocedures.pdf.
11 Examples of deceptive conduct include providing inadequate
disclosure of material lease terms in television advertising and
misrepresenting loan terms. See id.
12 Id. (emphasis added). The author highlights subsection (1) due to its
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B. The Abusive Power
Unlike the other UDAAP powers, the abusive prong does
not possess a lengthy history of enforcement due to its inclusion in
2010 through Dodd-Frank. Under the Consumer Financial
Protection Act ("CFPA"), or Title X of Dodd-Frank, Congress
provided a vague statutory definition of conduct that constitutes
an abusive act or practice. 3 Dodd-Frank states:
The Bureau shall have no authority under this section to
declare an act or practice abusive in connection with the
provision of a consumer financial product or service,
unless the act or practice-(1) materially interferes with
the ability of a consumer to understand a term or
condition of a consumer financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of-(A) a lack of
understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or
service; (B) the inability of the consumer to protect the
interests of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer
financial product or service; or (C) the reasonable
reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in
the interests of the consumer. 14
This statutory definition "is broad and arguably subjective
in nature."1 5 As a result, the abusive standard is the subject of
much "hand wringing in the financial services industry and
excitement

amongst

consumer

advocates."'

6

For

example,

consumer advocates seek to utilize this broad power to "tap the
growing body of behavioral economic analysis of consumer
importance later in the paper. This portion is overlapping with many actions
under the abusive power. See infra Part 111.
13 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2015). This author addresses this vagueness
throughout the enforcement section. See infra Part III.
14 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2015). Further, Dodd-Frank defines "covered
person" as "(A) any person that engages in offering or providing a consumer
financial product or service; and (B)any affiliate of a person described in
subparagraph (A) if such affiliate acts as a service provider to such person."
See 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2010). In this Article, covered person is
synonymous with covered entity.
15 Laurie A. Lucas et al., Abusive Acts of Practices under the CFPA's
UDAAP Prohibition, 71 Bus. LAW. 749, 750 (2016).
16 Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law
Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TULANE L. REV. 1057, 1070 (2016).
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contracts to prevent harmful practices not effectively addressed by
the deceptive-and-unfair practices prohibition."' 7 In contrast,
those in the financial services industry worry that without
clarification the standard will become "infinitely flexible and
therefore meaningless," thereby granting the Bureau unfettered
power to over-regulate the industry.' 8 Thus, while consumer
advocates urge the Bureau to refrain from rulemaking, businesses
in the financial services industry urge the Bureau to act and
narrow the abusive power's scope or, at a minimum, define its
contours through rulemaking.
To date, the Bureau has not initiated rulemaking, but they
have brought thirty (30)19 actions under this power. 2 0 While many
of these enforcement actions are helpful in defining the power,
commentators criticize the Bureau's regulation by enforcement
practices due to the inability of covered entities to possess prior
knowledge of conduct that the CFPB seeks to prohibit. 21 These
actions remain largely confusing because of the minimal depth of
discussion of the standard in many cases. 2 2 Further, the abusive
standard is particularly confusing because twenty-eight (28) of the
thirty (30) abusive actions involve the abusive standard in
conjunction with either the unfair or the deceptive standards,
thereby, leaving many individuals to question the relevancy of the
abusive power and whether the two stand-alone actions should
also represent claims under the unfair and deceptive power. 2 3
Accordingly, to understand the current scope and confusion
exhibited by the abusive power, the necessity of rulemaking, and
the extent of such a rule, an analysis of current agency and court
precedent follows.

Id.
18 Id.
19 The separate enforcement actions against D&D Marketing, Inc. d/bla
T3Leads, Davit Gasparyan, and Dmitry Fomichev are combined due to all
three enforcement actions arising from T3Leads deceptive and abusive
marketing activity. Further, this number includes actions up to Certified
Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC in September 2019.
17

20 CONSUMER

FIN.

PROT.

BUREAU,

Enforcement

Actions,

https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/.
21 Infra Part IV.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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THE CFPB 's ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES
The Bureau acts under their abusive power if they possess
the power to declare the practice abusive under one of its four
statutory definitions codified by Dodd-Frank. While many
violations satisfy more than one of the four statutory definitions,
general themes and conduct appear around each category with
distinct features and groupings. The primary issue in rulemaking,
though, is whether rulemaking would be necessary to further
clarify, limit, or expand one of the groupings or features within a
statutorily defined category because the majority of these actions
clearly overlap with the prohibition on unfair and deceptive acts
or practices.
A. Category One: Materially interferes with the ability of a
consumer to understanda term or condition of a consumer
financialproduct or service
Under the first statutory category, the Bureau may declare
an act or practice abusive if it "materially interferes with the ability
of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer
financial product or service."2 4 This category generally revolves
around activities that are misleading and represents practices that
involve one or more of the following three groups: (i)
misrepresentations, (ii) withholding information, and (iii)
deliberately designing a process to prevent the consumer from
understanding a term or condition of their financial product. 2 5
1. Misrepresentations
The first group under this category involves practices that
materially interfere with the consumer's ability to understand a
term or condition due to a company's misrepresentations. 26 In
12 U.S.C. § 5531 (d)(1) (2010).
Susan Manship Seaman, "Abusive" Acts or Practices: A Different
Approach, 71 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 288, 289 (2017)
26 Id. at 290; See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC,
332 F. Supp. 3d 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding "[r]epresentations that a
transaction is a sale when it does not, in fact, transfer validly any rights of
ownership from the consumer to the RD Entities are materially misleading
because such representations are false," therefore, the act or practice is
abusive); complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. NDG Fin. Corp., No.
1:15-cv-05211-CM, 2015 WL 4638325 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2015); complaint,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Pension Funding, LLC., No. 8:15-cv-01329,
24
25
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NDG Financial Corp., the Bureau alleged that through its business
practices NDG Financial Corp. ("NDG") and its subsidiaries
distributed payday loans over the internet to consumers in all fifty
states with interest rates above the amount permitted under state
usury laws. 2 7 When consumers complained to NDG, NDG falsely
informed them that state usury laws did not apply to the
consumer's loan because its subsidiary, whom held NDG's
consumer accounts, were organized under the laws of the Republic
of Malta. 28 The Bureau alleged that NDG's conduct of "[f]alsely
representing to consumers that the loans they sought (1) are valid
and must be repaid and (2) are not covered by state or federal law
'materially interferes' with consumers' ability to understand the
terms and conditions of their loans." 29 Accordingly, NDG took
affirmative action to prevent consumers from possessing the
requisite knowledge to understand their product and this
30
misrepresentation of the product's terms is abusive.
2. Withholding Information
The second group under this category involve practices
whereby the company withholds a crucial term or condition
involving the consumer's product, which prevents the consumer
from making decisions regarding their product or service31 In All
2015 WL 4940079 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2015) (alleging the defendant's
conduct of falsely representing to consumers that loans were actually

"pension advances" and lacked an interest rate or had a substantially lower
interest rate was abusive when in fact the product was a loan with a high
interest rate).
27 Complaint at ¶1 120-22, 130-43, NDG Fin. Corp., No. 1:15-cv-05211CM, 2015 WL 4638325 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
28 Id. at %89.
29

Decision and Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, NDG Fin.

Corp., No. 1:15-cv-05211-CM, 2016 WL 7188792, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2,
2016).
No. 1:15-cv-05211-CM, 2015 WL
30 Complaint, NDG Fin. Corp.,

4638325 (also alleging claims of deceptive and unfair practices).

31 Seaman, supra note 26 at 290; see also, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 8, 2016) (alleging

the defendant's acts of opening credit card accounts using consumers'
information without their knowledge or consent materially interfered with the
ability to understand the terms or condition of a consumer financial product
and, therefore, was abusive); complaint at ¶ 83, Pension Funding, LLC., No.
8:15-cv-01329, 2015 WL 4940079 (alleging the defendant's conduct was
abusive by failing to disclose and misrepresenting the high interest rates
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American Check Cashing, Inc. the CFPB took action against a
covered entity due to "a.policy to never tell the consumer the fee
[of a check cashing service]--even when the consumer asks," and
for the its continual conduct of blocking consumer access to view
or discover the fee, and for making "misleading statements to
consumers about their ability to cancel" the transaction. 32 This
deliberate conduct to avoid disclosure of a term or condition
prevented the consumer from being informed about the terms of
their product or service; therefore, this practice is abusive.
3. Abusive Process
The final group under this category involves practices by
covered persons whereby a business or individual deliberately
designs a process, or instructs its agents, to interfere with the
consumer's ability to acquire information.3 3 For example, under
the "Opt-In Rule" it is unlawful for a bank to charge overdraft fees
on ATM and one-time debit card transactions unless the accountholder previously consented to overdraft coverage for those
transactions. 3 4 Overdraft fees are essential to many banks as a
source of revenue.3 5 In TCF National Bank, the defendant-bank
had an abnormally high opt-in rate-nearly triple that of other
banks.3 6 To achieve this, the bank developed a "pitch that would
maximize" opt-ins by forming a focus group to study the most
effective approach to obtain consumer opt-ins.3 7 The pitch, the

associated with their loans).
32 Complaint at ¶ 67, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. All Am. Check
Cashing, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00356-WHB-JCG (S.D. Miss. May 11, 2016).
33 See Seaman, supra note 26, at 290; see also, e.g., TMX Finance,
LLC., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0022, at ¶ 29 (Sept. 26, 2016) (alleging TMX
Finance's conduct materially interfered with the consumer's ability to
understand a term because the company trained its employees to use a sale
pitch that failed to provide the total cost of a consumer product if the
consumer paid over an extended period by including vast quantities of
irrelevant material as to distract the consumer from the total cost of the
product and, thereby, harming the consumer). Compare id. (alleging
deceptive and abusive practices) with Bridgepoint Education, Inc., CFPB No.
2016-CFPB-0016 (Sept. 12, 2016) (alleging only deceptive practices).
3 Complaint at T 17, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. TCF Nat'l Bank, No.
0:17-cv-00166 (D. Minn. Jan. 19, 2017).
35 Id. at %27 (emphasizing that overdraft fees are so critical to a bank's
revenue that TCF's CEO even named his boat the "Overdraft').
36 Id. at ¶31.
37 Id. at %% 49-57.
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CFPB alleges, was a short statement presented after certain
mandatory. provisions, which was effective because it led the
38
consumer to believe the opt-in provision was mandatory.
Essentially, the pitch characterized "opting in as a choice to allow
the Bank to provide a benefit" while remaining "silent as to the
attendant risks and costs." 3 9 Additionally, the Bureau alleged that
the bank coached its employees to overcome consumer objections
by presenting a hypothetical to the consumer detailing a scenario
whereby the consumer's transaction would be publicly declined at
a store if they did not opt-in; therefore, the bank sought to elicit an
emotional response, through potential public shaming, forcing the
consumer to accept the provision. 4 0 The CFPB alleged that the
entire process used by the defendant-bank materially interfered
with the consumer's ability to understand a crucial term of their
4
financial product and, therefore, their conduct was abusive. 1
on
based
CFPB . action
every
Interestingly,
misrepresentations and withholding information overlaps with
one or more other statutorily defined abusive category. In contrast,
the Bureau has not brought claims of an abusive process under any
other defined category. This third group represents the only clear
example of practices that do not overlap with the other abusive
categories. This group, though, still may overlap with the
prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
Additionally, every action in this first category overlaps
with either the unfair or deceptive prongs. For example,
misrepresentations and withholding information clearly fall within
the scope of the prohibition on deceptive practices per guidance
42
provided by the CFPB because these actions mislead the public.
This gives rise to disagreement as to whether category one abusive
actions represent an expansion of the other UDAAP prohibitions
by simply allowing the Bureau to add a second claim to its
allegations. Similarly, this raises the issue of whether category one
abusive actions are merely repetitive of the deceptive power. In
either scenario, the scope of the abusive power under category one
38
39
40
41

Id. at ¶M 67-73.
Id. at ¶ 74.
Id. at ¶185.
See generally Eric Mogilnicki & D. Jean Veta, Bloomberg Law Insights:
COVINGTON

(2017),

https://www.cov.comImedia/files/corporate/publications/2017/02/definingabusive_acts

and_pra

Defining

ctices.pdf.
42

'Abusive'

Supra note 10.

Acts

and

Practices,
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remains indiscernible from the deceptive power.
B. Category Two: Takes unreasonableadvantage of a lack of
understanding on the part of the consumer of the material
risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service
Under the second defined category, the CFPB may declare
an act or practice abusive if it "takes unreasonable advantage ofa lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the material
risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service." 4 3 This category
is the most frequently used prong of the abusive standard and
represents a wide range of conduct and industries; therefore, the
category is difficult to classify into succinct groups. 44 Actions under
this category, though, possess two features.
1. Information Asymmetry
The first feature is that the covered person possesses vastly
greater knowledge on a transaction or product than the consumer
and, as a result, the consumer does not understand the product or
service. In most scenarios, a business will possess greater
knowledge of their own product than the average consumer;
however, an abusive practice arises where the covered entity
possesses greater knowledge, or the consumer possess significantly
less knowledge, as a result of the covered entity's (1)
misrepresentations, (2) knowledge of state law implications, or (3)
omissions.4 5 Although similar to the first category, information
asymmetry under this category relates to the consumer's prior
insufficient knowledge of the implications or effects of the
consumer's product as opposed to the first category's ability of the
consumer to understanda term or condition within the contract or
product itself.
First, abusive conduct may arise from information
asymmetries due to misrepresentations as to the cost of a
businesses' product or service, thereby, preventing the consumer
from understanding the risks involved. 4 6 Costs may be money,
12 U.S.C. § 5531 (d)(2)(A) (2010).
Seaman, supra note 26, at 291.
45 Id.; see, e.g., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Am. Debt Settlement
Sols., No. 9:13-cv-80548-DMM, 2013 WL 12094225 (S.D. Fla. June 7, 2013).
46 See complaint at 111 12, 80, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. v. Certified
Forensic Loan Auditors, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-07722 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2019)
(alleging that the defendant "misrepresented the effectiveness of" their audits
43
4

56
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time, or otherwise. In 2013, the CFPB brought its first allegation
of abuse against American Debt Settlement Solutions, Inc.
("ADSS"), a debt relief service that helps consumers "renegotiate,
47
settle, reduce or otherwise alter the terms of at least one debt."
The Bureau alleged that ADSS enrolled its consumers in its
programs for twenty-four (24) to forty-eight (48) months in
exchange for an enrollment fee-typically, fifteen percent (15%) of
the consumers' enrolled debts that were due within three (3) to six
(6) months of enrollment-plus a monthly service fee-typically,
ninety-nine dollars ($99).48 In its welcome package, ADSS
represented to consumers that the "first settlement [of debts] could
be in 90 days or as much as six months." 4 9 In reality, during the
first three to six months ADSS did not settle a vast majority of the
consumer's debts until the distressed consumer paid their
enrollment fees.5 0 Meanwhile, ADSS continued to charge the
consumers monthly service charges. This conduct served to only
compound the consumer's debt problems by adding additional
ADSS debt to the consumer's prior liabilities. The CFPB alleged
that this practice took "unreasonable advantage of consumers'
lack of understanding of how long it would take ADSS to settle
their debts and therefore how much money they would spend
before realizing any benefits from enrolling."5 1 Thus, ADSS'
conduct was abusive because they misrepresented their program's
benefits by taking unreasonable advantage of the consumer's lack
of understanding of the costs and time required to settle or
renegotiate a consumer's debts.
that would supposedly "help consumers avoid foreclosures or negotiate loan
modifications" in an effort to convince those consumers to purchase their
services); complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. D&D Mktg., Inc., No.
2:15-cv-09692, 2015 WL 9268745 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2015) (alleging that
T3Leads failure to correct a misrepresentation that it knew or should have
known existed resulted in harm to the consumer and was abusive); complaint
at ¶J 57-63, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin.,
Inc., No. 3:15-cv-02106, 2015 WL 2168878 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2015)
(alleging that the defendant misrepresented their product as money saving
because consumers were unlikely to understand that during the first several
years of enrollment they will actually pay more in fees to defendant than they
will save in those years).
47 Complaint at ¶¶ 6-7, Am. Debt Settlement Sols., No. 9:13-cv-80548DMM (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2013).
48 Id. at $I 12-13.
49 Id. at ¶ 24.
50 Id. at¶60.
51 Id. at¶ 61.
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Further, information asymmetries may arise from entities
who take advantage of a consumer's lack of understanding of state
lending or usury laws. 5 2 In Colfax Capital Corp., the CFPB alleged
that the covered entity sent billing notices for, and demanded
payments on, financing agreements voided by state law due to
them exceeding usury limits or the lender failing to have proper
licensing requirements. The entity informed consumers, expressly
or impliedly, that "the entire loan balances were owed to them, that
they were legally authorized to collect the associated payments,
and that the consumers were legally obligated to pay."53 The CFPB
stated that, in general, consumers do not know or understand the
impact licensing and usury laws have on their loans or other
agreements. 54 Thus, the CFPB declared that by taking advantage
of the consumer's lack of understanding of these laws, with full
knowledge that the law voided the loans, the entity engaged in an
abusive practice.55
Similarly, the Bureau brought one of its two stand-alone
abusive allegations against Zero Parallel for distributing leads, or
consumer information, to lenders whom Zero Parallel knew made
loans more than that permitted by state law. 5 6 As a result,
consumers paid interest rates in excess of state usury limits and
lenders either could not distribute certain loans after paying for the
lead or the lender could not collect the loan upon default because
such loan violated state law. The Bureau alleged that Zero Parallel
violated the prohibition on abusive practices because their actions
took "unreasonable advantage of. . . a lack of understanding on
the part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or conditions
In numerous instances, the CFPB has alleged a practice was abusive
because the entity tried to collect uncollectable loans that violated state usury
limits or licensing requirements to which the entity was prevented by law from
collecting. See, e.g., Colfax Capital Corp., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0009, at ¶1
39 (July 29, 2014), complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Think Fin.,
LLC., No. 4:17-cv-00127-BMM (D. Mont. Nov. 15, 2017); complaint at¶ 151,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Golden Valley Lending, Inc., No. 1:17-cv03155 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2017); complaint at I 138-43, Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau v. NDG Fin. Corp., No. 1:15-cv-05211-CM, 2015 WL 4638325
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2015); complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. CashCall,
Inc., No. 1:13-cv-1 3167, 2013 WL 11106649 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2013).
53 Colfax Capital Corp, CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0009, at ¶ 39 (July 29,
52

2014).

Id. at %42.
Id. at ¶M 43-44.
56 Zero Parallel, LLC, CFPB No. 2017-CFPB-0017, at %1 17, 21-24
(Sept. 06, 2017).
5
55
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of a product or service." 5 7
Interestingly, Zero Parallel had no contact with consumers,
but merely distributed their information to lenders. Zero Parallel
represents an expansion of the abusive power to third parties.
Further, since Zero Parallelwas an abusive allegation without an
unfair or deceptive claim, legal scholars debate on whether Zero
Parallel makes the abusive power distinct from unfair and
deceptive claims or if it merely represents the Bureau's discretion
to liberally bring actions under any of the three enforcement
powers.58 In either situation, Zero Parallelshows that the Bureau
will use the abusive power to extend liability to third party lead
generators who act as a middleman in transactions at the expense
of the consumer and, possibly, the lender. Accordingly, the scope
of the power is broad, and the Bureau will penalize both the entity
attempting to collect invalid loans and those assisting or aiding
them to the detriment of the consumer.
Finally, category two actions may involve omissions by the
59
entity allowing the business to gain an unfair advantage. For
Id. at ¶T 23; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (d)(2)(A) (2010).
The author of this Article notes that in its press release the CFPB
ordered Gasparyan, Zero Parallel's owner, to "ensure that lead generators
do not deceive consumer." Id. This leads the author to believe that the CFPB
could have alleged a claim under the deceptive or unfair powers against Zero
Parallel or Gasparyan. Press Release, CFPB, CFPB Takes Action Against
Zero Parallel for Steering Consumers Toward Bad Deals (Sept. 06, 2017) (on
file with CFPB) (emphasis added). See also Roquemore, supra note 7, at
204 (stating, "it is likely that the CFPB could have brought a successful
unfairness claim against Zero Parallel").
59 See Cash Express, LLC, CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0007 (Oct. 24, 2018);
Fort Knox Nat'l Co., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0008 (Apr. 20, 2015) (alleging
the defendants conduct of failing to disclose specific fees and not notify
servicemen when they incurred such fees was abusive because it took
unreasonable advantage of service members' lack of understanding);
complaint at IM 72-84, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. v. Certified Forensic
Loan Auditors, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-07722 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2019) (alleging
that the defendants "concealed material facts regarding the Audits and
litigation documents from consumers," therefore, the "consumers lacked the
ability to parse the conclusions and analysis in the Audits and discover their
lack of merit"); complaint at I 64-66, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v.
Freedom Debt Relief, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-06484 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017)
(alleging that Freedom took unreasonable advantage of consumers' lack of
understanding by failing to disclose to consumers enrolling in their debtsettlement program that: (1) the consumer would be required to negotiate
directly with the creditor because Freedom knew that certain creditors would
not negotiate with third-party debt-settlement providers, and (2) even though
57
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example, in Cash Express, LLC, the entity's primary venture was
cashing payday checks while loaning cash to individuals as a
payday loan.6 0 In its alleged abusive practice, when a consumer
visited the entity's store for cash-checking, the entity would
instruct its employees to determine whether the consumer also
owed the entity money from any prior payday loan. 6 1 All of Cash
Express' loans contained disclosures that Cash Express may
exercise a right of set-off. 62 To obtain the payday loan, Cash
Express required the consumer to sign an acknowledgment. 63
Later, if a delinquent consumer entered the store to cash his or her
check, Cash Express instructed its employees to take the check,
preventing the customer from leaving the store with it. 6 4 Cash
Express instructed its employees to not inform the consumer that
it was going to exercise its right of set-off under the prior loan
before taking the check. 65 After subtracting the amount owed to
Cash Express, the employee would then give the consumer the
remainder and explain what had occurred. 6 6 Because Cash
Express' employees knew about the boilerplate term and many
consumers did not, the CFPB alleged that by failing to disclose the
business' exercise of set-off, Cash Express took unreasonable
advantage of the lack of understanding on the part of the
consumer.67 This abusive conduct resulted from Cash Express'
deliberate action to act before informing the consumer causing
information asymmetry between the parties leading to consumer
harm.
2. Material risk, cost, or condition that likely would have affected
a consumer's choice or conduct if the consumer had known ...
The second feature of category two claims is that the action
must involve a material "risk, cost, or condition that likely would
have affected a consumer's choice or conduct if the consumer had

some consumers were individually required to negotiate their own debt
settlement, they were still obligated to pay Freedom its fee).
60 CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0007, at 1 25 (Oct. 24, 2018).
61 Id.
62

Id.

63

Id. at

6
6
66
67

Id. at n¶ 25-28.
Id.

26.

Id. at ¶ 29.
Id. at %% 35-36.
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known about the risk, cost, or condition." 68 The statute contains a
materiality qualifier in that the covered person's action must affect
a significant (material) risk, cost, or condition and not one of minor
importance. The risk or cost is one that would force the individual,
if aware and known, to reconsider their selection or continued use
69
of the covered person's financial product or service.
In general, materiality is fact specific. In American Debt
Settlement Solutions, the length of time required to realize the
benefits of the program and the costs of the program were
material. 70 In Colfax Capital Corp. and other usury and licensing
71
actions, the consumer's legal obligation to repay is material. In
Cash Express, LLC, non-disclosure of the entity's set-off right to
the consumer was essential for the practice to work and, therefore,
was material. 72 The central theme of this feature is that if the
consumer knew of the material risk, cost, or condition, then a
"reasonable consumer likely would not have made a particular
decision, e.g., made a payment, selected the product, trusted
73
advice, left funds in an account or enrolled in a program."
In conclusion, this second category is subject to
interpretation and contributes to many of the issues surrounding
the abusive standard. First, businesses almost always possess more
information about their product than the consumer. This raises
questions as to the amount of disclosure necessary and the degree
of persuasive advertising the company may engage in before their
conduct becomes misleading and subject to the Bureau's abusive
power. Next, whether a term or provision is material is entirely
subjective. Materiality is dependent upon the consumer's state of
mind, the adjudicator's opinion, and the CFPB director's opinion.
Finally, there is disagreement on whether the abusive power is
Seaman, supra note 26, at 292.
69 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (d)(2)(A) (2010).
70 Complaint at T161, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Am. Debt Settlement
Sols., No. 9:13-cv-80548-DMM (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2013).
71 CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0009, at T 36 (July 29, 2014); see also
complaint at ¶1149, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Golden Valley Lending,
Inc., No. 1:17-cv-03155 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2017) (alleging that the obligation
to repay is a material term); complaint at ¶116, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
v. Think Fin., LLC., No. 4:17-cv-00127-BMM (D. Mont. Nov. 15, 2017)
(asserting that the consumer's financial situation due to their inability to repay
is material to their decision).
72 Cash Express, LLC, CFPB No. 2018-BCFP-0007, at ¶ 34 (Oct. 24,
2018).
73 See Seaman, supra note 26, at 293.
68
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necessary in many of these enforcement actions because many of
these actions involve violations of the unfair and deceptive
standards. One legal scholar even notes that "it is likely that the
CFPB could have brought a successful unfairness claim against
Zero Parallel." 74 Thus, the second category adds fuel to the fire of
uncertainty because many individuals and businesses argue that
category two abusive claims are arbitrarily enforced, thereby,
prohibiting businesses from understanding the extent of the second
category and the actions within and excluded by it.
C. Category Three: Takes unreasonableadvantage of the inability
of the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in
selecting or using a consumerfinancialproduct or service
Under the third statutory definition, the Bureau may
declare an act or practice abusive if it "takes unreasonable
advantage of-the inability of the consumer to protect the interests
of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product
or service."75 Under this category, abusive acts or practices include:
(1) "burying" pro-lender provisions in contracts, (2) pressuring or
coercing the consumer into a transaction, and (3) directing
consumers to select their product by providing misleading or
omitting information. 76 Unlike the previous two categories, this
category does not require a misunderstanding of a term or its
implications, only that the company took advantage of the
consumer's inability to protect their interests due to their status,
financial predicament, or other similar situation.

Roquemore, supra note 7, at 204.
12 U.SC. § 5531 (d)(2)(B) (2010).
76 The author disagrees with the argument presented by Seaman's
article in that Aequitas stands for a fourth distinct and emerging type of act
or practice under this category. In Aequitas, Aequitas and Corinthian
Colleges did not disclose the loan process and the benefits they acquired at
the expense of the student-consumers. The CFPB does not generally bring
actions under the abusive standard for high-loan costs unless such the
consumer reasonable relied on the covered person to act in their interest or
the covered person deliberately lied to the consumer regarding uncollectable
loans due to usury limits. Thus, Aequitas belongs under the third group under
the third category relating to omissions and misrepresentations. Aequitas is
discussed in detail below. Seaman, supra note 26, at 293-94; see infra note
95.
74

75
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1. "Burying" Pro-Lender Terms
The first type of act or practice under this category occurs
where a lender provides a consumer a contract that hides a
surprising provision or term that a reasonable consumer would not
consent to if known." In Security National Automotive
Acceptance Co., the lender ("SNAAC") buried, in an addendum to
a car leasing agreement, "a provision purporting to give SNAAC
permission to contact the borrower's 'employer/commanding
officer' to assist in collecting in the event of default and for other
purposes."7 8 The provision was non-negotiable and the service
member-consumer did not have an opportunity to bargain for this
provision's removal. 79 The CFPB alleged that this practice was
abusive because the lender targeted service members and, without
the service member's knowledge of the provision, they buried the
provision in the contract in an attempt to leverage the consumer's
status for their gain in the event of default. Accordingly, SNAAC
took advantage of the consumer's inability to protect his or her
interests in selecting the terms of their financial by hiding the
provision.8 0 Critical to this grouping, CFPB requires the defendant
to (1) take advantage of the consumer's status, (2) bury or hide an
abusive provision, and (3) take an affirmative step towards
preventing the consumer from removing the provision by either
refusing to negotiate its removal or by preventing the consumer an
1
opportunity to read the agreement before consenting.s

77 See Sec. Nat'l Auto. Acceptance Co., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0027
(Oct. 28, 2015); complaint at ¶M 72-78; see also Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
v. Freedom Stores, Inc., No. 2:14-643, (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2014) (alleging that
the lender's practice of extending credit to consumers whereby the lender
buried a forum selection clause in the agreement and gave the consumer no
opportunity to review or negotiate the clause was abusive because the clause
mandated a venue a significant distance away from the consumer where a
default judgment in favor of the lender would likely occur in the event of a
dispute).
78 Sec. Nat'I Auto. Acceptance Co., supra note 77, at ¶12.
79 Id. at q 13.
80 Id. at IM23-29.
81 See id (stating that the SNAAC's conduct was abusive because many
consumer-service members were unaware of the provision allowing contact
with superiors and, even if they were aware, they could not negotiate the
removal of the provision from the contract); Complaint at I¶ 75-76, Freedom
Stores, Inc., No. 2:14-643.
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2. Pressure or Coercion
The second group under this category occurs when a
covered person unduly, pressures or coerces the consumer into
selecting or using their product or service. 82 These acts usually
involve the company possessing some outside right that gives them
the ability to pressure the consumer into selecting their product.
For example, in ITT Educational Services, Inc., the defendant,
ITT Educational Services, Inc. ("ITT"), was an educational
institution that relied on high student tuition costs to fund its
institution.83 To facilitate a funding gap, ITT increased its tuition
and pressured students to obtain private loans or an ITT loan. 84
The Bureau alleged that ITT knew many students lacked the
resources to pay their high tuition rates and many could not receive
outside private loans; therefore, ITT's high cost forced many
students to accept ITT loans or forfeit their educational
investment by dropping out.

5

The CFPB alleged that this practice

was abusive because ITT pressured students without the ability to
acquire outside loans to obtain ITT loans and if they did not pay
See Sec. Nat'l Auto. Acceptance Co., CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0027
(Oct. 28, 2015) (stating that SNAAC's conduct was abusive because they
used a service members' status to exert "enormous pressures" by contacting
their superior offices, which would not be available in the collection of civilian
borrower debt); Ace Cash Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008, at jIM1
12, 28-31 (July 10, 2014) (alleging the covered person took unreasonable
advantage of the consumer's inability to protect their own interests in
selecting a financial product or service by creating an artificial sense of
urgency through excessive calls, continuing collection activity after requests
to cease, and threats to report the consumer to credit bureaus or other
collection services in order to induce delinquent borrowers to take out a new
ACE loan); complaint at ¶[ 70, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. All Am. Check
Cashing, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00356-WHB-JCG (S.D. Miss. May 11, 2016)
(alleging the defendant took unreasonable advantage of the inability of the
consumer to protect their interests by pressuring their consumers through
"retaining custody of the check [financial product] to prevent consumers from
leaving, processing the check without the consumer's consent, applying an
AACC stamp to the back of the check during processing to impair the
consumer's ability to cash the check elsewhere," and by making
misrepresentations about the transaction was abusive); complaint,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:1 4-cv-00292SEB-TAB, 2014 WL 717457 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 26, 2014).
83 Complaint at ¶ 23, ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00292-SEBTAB, 2014 WL 717457.
8 Id. at IM 97-98, 114-32.
85 Id. at I 171-73.
82
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their increased tuition rates within a certain period of time, ITT
would withhold the student's transcripts or expel them due to
nonpayment. ITT took advantage of a consumer's financial
predicament. Accordingly, by coercing students to drop out or
accept its loan within a fixed amount of time, this practice harmed
student-consumers by placing pressure on them in making an
informed decision in selecting a financial product; therefore, ITT's
conduct was abusive. 86
3. Intentional Misdirection
The final group occurs when a company or agent takes
unreasonable advantage of the inability of the consumer to protect
his or her interests in the selection or use of a financial product by
or
omissions
through
consumer
the
misdirecting
misrepresentations."' This group is similar to the first and second
86 Id. Additionally, the CFPB is not consistent in bringing abusive claims
in this category. For example, the CFPB stated that creating an artificial
sense of urgency towards a consumer for a payday loan was unfair,
deceptive, and abusive, but creating "an artificial sense of urgency" for a
matter involving a student loan was only deceptive. Compare Ace Cash
Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008 (July 20, 2014) with complaint,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. v. Glob. Fin. Support, No. 15-cv-2440-GPCWVG (S.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2015).
87 See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015, at 1 21
(Sept. 8, 2016) (alleging that the "Respondent's act of opening unauthorized
deposit accounts and engaging in simulated funding took unreasonable
advantage of consumers' inability to protect their interests in selecting or
using consumer financial products or services); Y Kings S Corp., CFPB No.
2016-CFPB-0001 (Jan. 21, 2016) (alleging that by failing to disclose the
prices of cars until after credit approval and by misrepresenting the APR
charged to its credit consumers, and by failing to disclose accurate finance
charges, consumers are unable to protect their interest in selecting or using
the credit transactions with the entity); Fort Knox Nat'l Co., CFPB No. 2015CFPB-0008 (Apr. 20, 2015) (alleging that the covered person's failure to
adequately disclose the circumstances under which fees were charged and
its failure to inform the consumer when they incurred such fees took
unreasonable advantage of the consumer's inability to protect their interests;
complaint at IN 70-75, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding,
LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); complaint at ¶J¶ 83-86, Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Pension Funding, LLC., No. 8:15-cv-01329, 2015 WL
4940079 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2015); complaint at TT 70-75, Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau v. PayPal, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-01426 (D. Md. May 19, 2015)
(alleging that by failing to provide adequate information to consumers about
how it allocated payments to and among standard and multiple deferred-
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categories of omissions and misrepresentations; however, under
this group, a covered entity steers the consumer into choosing their
product or service as a result of their status-it does not necessarily
affect their understanding of the terms or implications of such
product. For example, in S/W Tax Loans, Inc., Thomas, an
operator of H&R Block franchises," deliberately targeted lowincome, vulnerable consumers by referring such consumers using
H&R Block to Southwest Tax Loans, a business wholly owned and
operated by Thomas. 8 9 Thomas created Southwest Tax Loans to
provide cash-strapped and vulnerable consumers with high-cost
refund-anticipated loans in November and December secured by
their income tax refund the following season at an annualpercentage-rate ("APR") above 240%.90 Through this practice,
Thomas did not disclose to the referred consumers that H&R Block
offered similar loans to meet the client's short-term holiday needs
with significantly lower APRs-around 36%.91 Thomas also did
not disclose that he and his tax preparers had a financial interest
in -each Southwest refund-anticipated loan the consumer took
out. 9 2 The CFPB declared that this practice was abusive because
"by failing to disclose their financial interests," Thomas and
Southwest Tax Loans took advantage of low-income clients
because these clients "lacked important information in evaluating
whether to choose a Southwest RAL or to seek an alternative
financial product to meet their short-term cash needs." 93
Accordingly, the business used the consumer's financial
predicament coupled with the absence of critical information to
steer the consumer into selecting their product. Thus, under the
third group, even if the consumer was aware of the harmful terms
or effects, they may still have selected that product, but since the
covered person took advantage of the consumer's status and
steered them into their product, such conduct was abusive.

interest balance the consumer could not understand how payments were
applied, thereby, taking advantage of the consumer's ability to select a
different product); complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. S/W Tax Loans,
Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00299 (D.N.M. Apr. 14, 2015).
88 H&R Block is a tax-preparation business offering financial products.
H&R Block is not a defendant in this action.
89 Complaint at 5¶ 10, 12, 42-44, S/W Tax Loans, Inc., No. 1:15-cv00299.
90 Id. at
14, 22.
91 Id. at
13-14, 42.
92 Id. at
13, 42, 44-46.
93 Id. at ¶M 46-48.
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4. Aequitas CapitalMgmt.
In 2017, the CFPB brought allegations solely alleging abuse
against Aequitas Capital Management ("Aequitas") under this
third category. 9 4 Under federal law, to obtain federal funding forprofit educational institutions must satisfy the requirements
imposed by the "90/10" rule. 9 5 To meet these standards, Corinthian
Colleges, Inc. ("Corinthian") increased student tuition rates and
set-up its own private loan program to assist students in obtaining
outside loans. 9 6 Later, as a result of changes in federal law
prohibiting Corinthian from operating its own loan program,
Corinthian elicited the assistance of Aequitas to fund, purchase,
and maintain the loans of its students as part of a scheme to allow
97
Corinthian to "present a fagade of compliance with federal laws."
Under this scheme, Aequitas would purchase loans from students
at Corinthian and, in return, Corinthian promised to repurchase
98
any loan that remained delinquent in excess of ninety (90) days.
In effect, Aequitas obtained extremely profitable loans with zero
risks and, even though Corinthian would never actually realize any
revenue from outside funds "because the cost of buying back nonperforming loans and maintaining the program would absorb any
99
such revenue," Corinthian gained access to federal funds.
Subsequently, the CFPB brought separate actions against
Corinthian and Aequitas.10 0 The Bureau alleged that Aequitas's
participation in the scheme by funding, supporting, and
maintaining the student loan portfolios took unreasonable
9 Complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Aequitas Capital Mgmt.
Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO (D. Or. Aug. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Aequitas
Complaint].
95 Under the 90/10 rule, for-profit institutions must derive at least ten
percent of their income from sources of revenue other than federal aid such
as private loan providers. See 20 U.S.C.S. § 1094 (2019); Aequitas
Complaint, supra note 95, at ¶ 46.
9 Aequitas Complaint, supra note 95, at ¶ 13.
97 Id. at ¶M 1, 3.
98

Id. at ¶ 4.

99 Id. at IM 4, 10, 118
100 On September 16, 2014, the CFPB filed a complaint against
Corinthian alleging violations of the prohibition on deceptive and unfair
practices. In the author's opinion, if the Bureau brought actions against
Aequitas and Corinthian for the same transaction and practices, then either
Aequitas should not face an abusive action or Corinthian should. See
complaint at ¶11 157, 164, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Corinthian Colls.,
Inc., No. 1:14-cv-07194, 2014 WL 5786691 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014).

2019

Scouring Muddied Waters

67

advantage of the students. By preventing students from possessing
the information necessary to protect their interests in selecting a
loan, students were unable to uncover the fact that the loan
program and the inflated tuition rates were "a loss leader and a
ruse designed to generate Title IV federal loan revenue." 0 1
Consequentially, because the scheme saddled students with more
debt, provided no additional benefit, and targeted students whom
Aequitas knew were high-default risk, Aequitas' participation was
abusive.
The CFPB's action against Aequitas stems from their
failure to disclose to the financially burdened, student consumers
their financial interest in the scheme. If students were aware of
Aequitas participation, then they would possess the necessary
information to make an informed decision. That decision may
cause them to take the loans from Corinthian Colleges and
Aequitas or another loan provider. Regardless of the student's
choice, both entities took advantage of the consumer's status as a
poor student. Accordingly, student-consumers did not have an
opportunity to make that decision and the Bureau deemed such
conduct abusive.
Additionally, Aequitas is interesting in that the CFPB
brought an action against a third party that had little to no direct
contact with the consumer but were merely complicit in
maintaining student accounts. Like Zero Parallel, LLC, some
individuals argue that this may represent an expansion of the
abusive power under the third category to third-parties while
others assert that the Bureau could have easily declared Aequitas's
actions as unfair or deceptive. 1 0 2 In either scenario, Aequitas
Capital Management, Inc. and the other actions under the third
category fail to differentiate the abusive power from the unfair and
deceptive powers. Aequitas Capital Management Inc. provides
little clarity in assisting the financial community in understanding
the extent of the abusive power and the conduct the power
encompasses distinguishing it from the unfair or deceptive powers.
Aequitas Complaint, supra note 95, at fJ 123, 126.
Compare Seaman, supra note 26, at 296-97 (stating "Aequitas
Capital ... could signal the CFPB's new use of this prong of the 'abusive'
standard") with Roquemore, supra note 7, at 203 (stating "the CFPB could
have just as easily relied on an allegation of unfairness in the Aequitas case").
The author does note that Aequitas may extend the third category to third
parties with little to no contact with consumers. This is like Zero Parallel.
Thus, abusive may simply be a way to capture third parties with no contact
with the consumer. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
101
102

Loyola Consumer Law Review

68

Vol. 32:1

D. Category Four:Takes unreasonableadvantage of the
reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act
in the interests of the consumer.
Finally, the CFPB may declare an act or practice abusive if
it "takes unreasonable advantage of-the reasonable reliance by
the consumer on a covered person to act in the interests of the
consumer."1 0 3 This category is the least used by the CFPB.
Practices typically violate the fourth statutory definition when the
company acts in their own interests, rather than the consumers. 104
The primary issue under this category is whether a consumer's
reliance is reasonable. Generally, the CFPB's enforcement actions
show that a consumer's reliance is reasonable in two instances. 10
First, if the company makes actual representations to the
consumer to rely on its product, then the consumer's reliance is
reasonable.1 0 6 In Navient Corp., a loan servicer's website told
consumers several statements that invited reliance by the
consumer. 107 Such statements included, "if you're having
trouble ... We can work with you . . . let us help you make the right
decision for your situation," "Our representative can help you by
identifying option," and "Navient is here to help." 10 8 The CFPB
alleged that Navient's conduct was abusive because "Navient
fostered the reliance that it then exploited at the expense of" its
consumers.

10 9

Second, a consumer's reliance is reasonable if the company

12 U.S.C. § 5531 (d)(2)(C) (2010).
Seaman, supra note 26, at 296.
105 Id. at 296-97.
106 See complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No.
3:17-cv-00101-RDM, 2017 WL 191446 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2017); complaint
at I 57, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Coll. Educ. Servs. LLC, No. 8:13-cv2078T36-EAJ (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2014) (alleging the company created a
reasonable reliance by the consumer because the company "created the
illusion of expertise and individualized advice to induce consumers to
reasonably rely on the company to act in their interests"); complaint at fi 62,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Am. Debt Settlement Sols., No. 9:13-cv80548-DMM (S.D. Fla. May 30, 2013) (alleging that the debt relief service
promised they could settle debts within three to six months when, in many
instances, they did not even begin negotiations in that period).
107 Complaint at ¶ 38, Navient Corp., No. 3:17-cv-001 01 -RDM, 2017 WL
191446.
108 Id.
109 Id. at ¶ 141.
103
104
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or individual is in a position that demands reliance. 10 This
position could be that of a lawyer who provides financial advisory
services, 1 financial aid advisors,11 2 or holding oneself out as a loan
counselor or advisor."' Thus, if one holds themselves out as
reasonably competent in the financial industry such position may
command reliance by the consumer for the company or individual
to act in the best interests of the consumer; however, whether
reasonable reliance may entail other relationships or actions,
though, remains an issue not addressed by the Bureau or the
courts.
A vast majority of the defined categories overlap with
another category of the abusive power causing additional
confusion as to the scope of each statutory definition and the scope
of the abusive power in general. Defining the abusive power is
critical for both consumers and businesses covered by the CFPB's
regulatory and supervisory authority to understand the types of
conduct and actions that encompass it. Legal scholars, though,
continue to disagree as to whether the CFPB should initiate
rulemaking to definitively specify actions and practices that
encompass each category or whether to keep the Bureau's power
broad allowing it to capture practices not otherwise foreseen or
covered.1 1 4
THE RULEMAKING CAMPS
The rarity of abusive allegations, especially stand-alone
abusive actions, arises from Dodd-Frank because (1) it fails to
provide heightened penalties for violations of more than one
Seaman, supra note 26, at 297.
"I' See complaint at 11 13, 64, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Access
Funding, LLC, 270 F. Supp. 831 (D. Md. 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-03750-JFM).
112 See complaint at T% 78, 174-80, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT
Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00292-SEB-TAB, 2014 WL 717457 (S.D. Ind.
Feb. 26, 2014).
113 See complaint at ¶ 57, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Coll. Educ.
Servs. LLC, No. 8:13-cv-2078T36-EAJ (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2014).
114 The author hopes that after reading Part III the reader has some
clarity. The defining characteristics of the abusive power are confusing
because of the overlap between the various statutory definitions and the
overlap with other powers. For example, misrepresentations and omissions,
in some form, appear in each of the statutory categories and is clearly
conduct looking to deceive consumers. This overlap makes some legal
scholars question the abusive power. This confusion is addressed in Parts
IV-VI.
110
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prohibited act and (2) covered persons, in general, are aware of acts
or practices that constitute unfair or deceptive practices due to an
115
extensive enforcement history by the Bureau and the FTC.
Currently, those in the legal and financial communities disagree on
whether the Bureau should initiate rulemaking to limit the abusive
power and, if initiated, whether the rule should grant a broad or
narrow mandate to the CFPB. Diverging interests and the CFPB's
failure, so far, to define the power's contours, have created three
camps: (1) those supporting rulemaking to narrow its scope and
bring clarity, (2) those supporting a broad mandate by either
providing a broad rule or by opposing the emergence of a rule
altogether, and (3) those that argue the abusive power itself is
irrelevant and unnecessary.
A. The Proponents to Rulemaking
Led by financial institutions and their affiliates, individuals
and businesses across a wide spectrum of industries and
geographic locations welcome the idea of initiating rulemaking to
define the contours and limit the scope of the CFPB's abusive
power. Proponents of rulemaking argue that any method other
than formal notice-and-comment rulemaking, such as regulation
by enforcement or issuing guidance documents, "interferes with
critical tools that regulatory beneficiaries can use to hold agencies
16
accountable for the policy choices they make."1 Proponents fear
that, in the absence of a rule, the CFPB will continue to engage in
provision of
conduct that would "regulate virtually every ...
of these
many
abolish
essentially
and
contracts
credit
consumer
7 Thus, several significant concerns arise if the Bureau
products.""'
does not proceed with rulemaking.
First, proponents assert that the statutory definition relies
on broad terms such as "lack of understanding by consumers" to
determine whether abusive or deceptive practices have
occurred.""s Subjective determination such as this would force
115 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1031, 5565(c) (2010).
116 BARR ET. AL., supra note 5, at 587 (quoting Nina A. Mendelson,
Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L.
REV. 397, 420 (2007)).
117

Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or

Menace, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 922 (2013)

Daniel Press, CEI Comments on the CFPB's Request for Information
Regarding Adopted Regulation and New Rulemaking Authorities,
COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (June 19, 2018) https://cei.org/content/cei118
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banks and other covered entities to conduct "customer-specific
inquiries regarding a consumer's 'financial literacy' or
understanding."1 9 This would result in significant time, cost, and
harm to these entities. Further, proponents argue that the statutory
definition is "so broad and vague that it is difficult to determine
what conduct it actually prohibits."1 20 Proponents assert that even
former Director Cordray lacked an understanding of the conduct
entailed under the abusive power when, before the House
Oversight Committee, he stated that "[i]n terms of abusive
specifically ... [we are] trying to understand it, and we have
determined that that is going to have to be a fact and circumstances
issue."' 2
Proponents argue that the CFPB cannot wait years for
courts to define the standard.1 22 Because of latent ambiguity, some
courts refuse to act in defining the contours of the standard so long
as it can rest its opinion upon another power (i.e. the unfair or
deceptive powers); therefore, businesses in the financial services
industry remain unaware of conduct prohibited by the standard
until the day arrives when the CFPB takes action against them.1 23
Additionally, these individuals and businesses argue that without
the ability to know or understand acts or practices encompassing
the power, the financial services industry would need to constantly
take an educated guess as to whether their product or practice
violates the abusive standard. Such guesswork "will likely chill
innovation and the introduction of new products."1 2 4
B. The Opponents of Rulemaking
Opponents of rulemaking generally support the .broad
comments-cfpbs-request-information-regarding-adopted-regulations-andnew-rulemaking..
119 Id.
120 Id.; see also Lucas, supra note 15, at 750.
121 How will the CFPB Function Under Richard Cordray: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Tarp, Fin. Serv. and Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs
of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, (112th Cong. 69 (2012)
(statement of Richard Cordray, Director, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau).
122 Press, supra note 118.
123 See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV-1 5-7522JFW, 2016 WL 4820635, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (holding that
"[b]ecause the Court concludes that CashCall and Delbert Services' conduct
was deceptive, the Court finds it unnecessary to address whether their
conduct was also unfair and abusive").
124 Zywicki, supra note 118, at 922.
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powers Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB in regulating financial
products. Composed of consumer advocacy groups and various
consumers, this group may either support a rule that retains the
Bureau's broad powers or oppose rulemaking altogether. In
contrast to the proponents of rulemaking, this group argues that
the CFPB must possess broad authority under the UDAAP powers
that would allow the Bureau to adapt to changing conditions
within the financial industry. To support their claim, they argue
that Congress explicitly designed Dodd-Frank to grant the CFPB
25
such broad authority to protect consumer interests.1 Opponents
argue that Congress' intentionally included the abusive term to
resolve consumer protection failures leading up to the financial
crisis of the late-2000s and such broad status is necessary to
maintain consumer confidence and protect the interests of
consumers.1 2 6 Without a broad mandate, businesses may engage in
harmful conduct toward consumers. While the unfair and
deceptive prongs may aid the Bureau in preventing such conduct,
the Bureau must retain its broad authority under the abusive
prong "to prevent harmful practices not effectively addressed by
the deceptive-and-unfair-practices prohibition."1 2 7
In response to rulemaking's proponents, opponents argue
that while the abusive power is broad, courts have held that the
statutory definitions are not legally vague. 1 2 8 In ITT Educational
Services Inc., the court ruled that "because agencies and courts
have successfully applied the term as used in closely related
consumer protection statutes and regulations-we [the court]
conclude that the language in question provides at least the
minimal level of clarity that the due process clause demands of
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 99 (2008) (calling for a new consumer financial protection agency
with "broad rulemaking and enforcement authority over consumer credit
products [to] eliminate regulatory gaps and contradictions . .. [and] halt the
state and federal regulatory competition that undercuts consumer safety").
126 Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer
125

Financial Protection Act's "Abusive" Standard, 14 J.

CONSUMER

& CoM. L.

118, 119 (2011).
127 Peterson, supra note 16, at 1070; see also S. Rep. No. 111-176, at
172 (2010) (stating that "[c]urrent law prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or
practices. The addition of 'abusive' will ensure that the Bureau is empowered
to cover practices where providers unreasonably take advantage of
consumers").
128 See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs., 219 F. Supp.
3d 878, 906 (S.D. Ind. 2015).
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non-criminal economic regulation. "129 Consumer advocates urge
that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague as entities have the
minimal level of clarity necessary to not engage in abusive acts or
practices. Accordingly, they argue that because businesses have
some clarity, the notion that businesses cannot avoid abusive
conduct has no merit. They have the requisite knowledge to not
engage in abusive conduct.
Further, consumer advocates argue that "new legal
standards are frequently drafted and enacted into law."1 30 In
enacting the prohibition on unfair and deceptive practices under
the Federal Trade Commission Act, Congress intentionally
"drafted the language broadly to allow regulators and courts to
continue to refine its definition and provide flexibility to close
regulatory gaps."1 3 I The abusive power's broad authority gives it
flexibility to adapt to marketplace conditions, while balancing
competing interests of private businesses and consumers.1 32
Consumer advocates argue that the abusive standard will
continually develop, thereby providing greater clarity in due time
while retaining some degree of flexibility to adapt.
Finally, consumer advocates assert that any rule narrowing
the power would result in a reduction of the standard's
effectiveness to the degree that the abusive standard would
become synonymous with unfair and deceptive while also
providing covered entities a "roadmap for what they can get away
with." 3 3 Allowing such practice, consumer advocates argue,
would benefit businesses at the expense of the consumer. Thus,
many consumer advocates assert that by narrowing the Bureau's
power to prohibit abusive practices, the current administration
would act contrary to the views of Congress in enacting the CFPA
and its broad regulatory grant of power to the CFPB to regulate
the financial industry.
C. The Irrelevant View
The final camp does not necessarily represent any specific
industry or types of people; however, this view stands in stark
129
130
131
132
133

Fading

Id.
Lee, supra note 126, at 121.
Id.; see 15 U.S.C.S. § 41 (1961).
Lee, supra note 126, at 121.
Evan Weinberger, Abusiveness Claims Brought by CFPB may be
Away,

BLOOMBERG
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30,
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contrast to the others. Those aligning with this view seem
unconcerned about any potential rulemaking because they argue
the abusive power is irrelevant. 13 4 These individuals believe that
"[a]busive basically means nothing more than unfair or
deceptive."1 3 5 Thus, many individuals argue that any action that is
abusive is also unfair or deceptive and rulemaking under the
abusive prong will not have any effect on the Bureau's power to
act under the other prongs. 136
In support of this view, individuals argue that in bringing
allegations of unfair, deceptive, or abusive practice, "the Bureau
[doesn't] seem bound by the definitions of any of the terms, and
simply label[s] practices to be UDAAP violations without worrying
13
Generally, these
about applying the elements of a statutory test."
Inc. and
Management
Capital
individuals are critical of Aequitas
Zero Parallel, alleging that the CFPB could have brought these
138
These
actions under the unfair or deceptive prohibitions.
two
these
brought
arbitrarily
CFPB
the
that
individuals assert
abusive
stand-alone
as
actions, within three weeks of each other,
allegations to bring clarity to the abusive power, but in reality, the
cases only further muddied the waters and showed that the
13 9
"abusive and unfairness standards are interchangeable."
134 See Adam Levitin, CFPB "Abusive" Rulemaking?, CREDIT SLIPS
(October 17, 2018), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/10/cfpbabusive-rulemaking.html (stating "If I were advising a financial institution
client, I'd say that there was little to worry about with the new 'abusive'
power").
135 Id.
136 Id. (stating the abusive "power has been little more than a belt to go
with the suspenders of 'unfair and deceptive'").
137 Christopher J. Willis, The CFPB's Proposed "Abusive" Rulemaking:
Much ado About Nothing, CONSUMER FINANCE MONITOR (October 18, 2018)
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2018/10/1 8/the-cfpbs-proposedabusive-rulemaking-much-ado-about-nothing/.
138 Roquemore, supra note 7, at 203 (stating that "Given the striking
similarity of fact patterns between the two cases [Aequitas Capital Mgmt. and
Navient] and the clear satisfaction of the statutory language, the CFPB could
have just as easily relied on an allegation of unfairness in the Aequitas case"
and "Given the similar fact patterns between the cases [Zero Parallel and
Flurish] and the straightforward application of the statutory language, it is
likely that the CFPB could have brought a successful unfairness claim against
Zero Parallel"); see Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17cv-00101-RDM, 2017 WL 3380530 at 1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017); Flurish, Inc.,
CFPB, No. 2016-CFPB-0023, 2016 WL 6646132 (Sept. 27, 2016).
139 Roquemore, supra note 7, at 204. The author disagrees slightly.
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Opponents to this view arise from those supporting and
opposing rulemaking. This view, opponents argue, neglects basic
principles of statutory construction and the legislative history of
the abusive power. First, this view ignores the statutory canon of
"verba cum effectu sunt accipienda" or the surplusage canon.1 4 0
The surplusage canon states that a "statute should be construed so
that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant."141 To equate
abusive to unfair and deceptive would render the power a mere
surplusage rendering its intentional addition to the original powers
insignificant and making the abusive power inoperative.
Accordingly, detractors of this view argue that equating the
abusive power to another term for unfair or deceptive would
ignore the power's entire legislative history. In the late-2000s,
Congress intentionally added the abusive power to be "flexible" to
ensure that the Bureau "is empowered to cover practices where
providers unreasonable take advantage of consumers."1 4 2 Thus,
opponents to this view assert that the irrelevant view is contrary
to basic principles of statutory interpretation as well as the
legislative history of the power and, therefore, the abusive power
must mean something different than unfair and deceptive, even
though opponents to the irrelevant view may disagree as to the
scope of the Bureau's abusive power.
THE BUREAU CANNOT SIT IDLE
As it stands, the abusive.power is confusing, overly broad,
and subject to arbitrary enforcement practices. The need for clarity
is evident and the CFPB should look to rein in this power. Gray
areas of the law, such as the abusive standard, can result in great
calamities if left unaddressed, especially in volatile industries such

While the author believes that abusive is synonymous with the unfair power
to a degree, he believes the abusive power shares greater similarity to the
deceptive power.
140 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAw: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXT 174 (2012).
141

Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A N. SINGER,

STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 46.06, pp. 181-186 (rev. 6th ed.

2000)).
142 See Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 40 (2007),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG1 10hhrg37556/html/CHRG110hhrg37556.htm; see also S. REP. No. 111-176, at 172 (2010).
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as the financial services industry. The abusive standard cannot
continue in its muddied form for several reasons.
First, the abusive power is muddied water, but it is still
water. The abusive power was not a term that Congress
unintentionally created.1 43 Congress intended the term to be
flexible and to supplement the unfair and deceptive powers given
to the CFPB. 14 4 Equating abusive to the unfair and deceptive
powers would render the term meaningless, thereby, defying the
intent of Congress. The irrelevant view ignores these
considerations. Thus, the CFPB should initiate rulemaking to
push aside the notions put forth by the irrelevant view.
Second, businesses must have clarity in the conduct the
Bureau looks to prevent under the abusive power. While many
individuals argue that rulemaking would provide businesses a
"roadmap for what they can get away with," rulemaking may
actually prevent a business from engaging in abusive conduct. 145 If
a business knew the conduct that constituted an abusive act or
practice, then the business could avoid engaging in such conduct.
This would benefit consumers by preventing consumers from
undergoing emotional, physical, and financial stress that results
from abusive practices. Further, it would aid businesses by
preventing them from falling victim to substantial civil penalties
imposed by the Bureau. Thus, rulemaking would grant businesses
clarity to steer themselves away from conducting prohibited acts
or practices.
Third, the Bureau has arbitrarily used the abusive standard
in its enforcement actions, thereby, preventing any clarity to the
scope and extent of the conduct the power entails. The Bureau has
brought certain actions under the abusive power while failing to
bring abusive allegations against businesses engaged in near
identical facts and practices. 1 46 In addition, this practice of
Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 40 (2007),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG1 10hhrg37556/html/CHRG1 10hhrg37556.htm.
143

144

Id.

See Weinberger, supra note 134.
Compare Ace Cash Express, Inc., CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0008, (July
20, 2014) (alleging that creating a sense of urgency towards a distressed
consumer considering a payday loan is abusive when none exists) with
complaint, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. v. Glob. Fin. Support, No. 15-cv2440-GPC-WVG (S.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2015) (alleging that creating a sense of
urgency for a consumer considering a student loan is only deceptive);
145
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arbitrarily enforcing the abusive standard between entities
engaged in similar schemes or practices cannot continue because
arbitrary enforcement denies businesses the ability to understand
the power's scope and contours. For example, the CFPB brought
allegations against Corinthian College for violations of the unfair
and deceptive standards but failed to bring an action against it for
violating the abusive prong. 147 While there may be debate as to
whether Aequitas violated the abusive prong or the unfair and
deceptive prongs, Corinthian Colleges actively engaged Aequitas
to take-the loans, thereby, intertwining the two. It remains unclear
as to the reasoning behind the Bureau's action of bringing an
abusive claim against Aequitas yet failing to bring an abusive
action against Corinthian Colleges-they both engaged in the
same conspiracy and worked together. Aequitas faced an abusive
claim and Corinthian Colleges faced a deceptive and unfair claim.
It is possible that the Bureau was simply trying to use all three
UDAAP prongs in one transaction and lacks any meaningful
standard in their enforcement practices. This example serves as
one instance of many in which the CFPB director and his or her
subordinates arbitrarily bring abusive allegations. This conduct is
not conducive to a properly functioning regulatory system as it fails
to provide clarity and consistency in the Bureau's enforcement
practices.
Further, the Bureau's two actions involving stand-alone
abusive allegations, Aequitas CapitalManagement Inc. and Zero
Parallel, are clear examples of uncertainty in the legal
community. 148 Individuals continually disagree on whether these
actions represent an expansion of the abusive power by expanding
the power to entities that are peripheral to the main participants in
a transaction and whom have little to no contact with the
consumer. 149 Others, however, argue that these actions represent
allegations that may have been brought under the prohibition on
unfair and deceptive practices, but the Bureau simply brought
compare TMX Finance, LLC., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0022, at ¶29 (Sept. 26,
2016) (alleging deceptive and abusive practices) with Bridgepoint Education,
Inc., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0016 (Sept. 12, 2016) (alleging only deceptive
practices).
147 See complaint at ¶M 157, 164, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v.
Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-07194, 2014 WL 5786691 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
16, 2014).
148 See Zero Parallel, LLC., CFPB No. 2017-CFPB-0017 (Sept. 06,
2017); Aequitas Complaint, supra note 94.
149 Supra notes 59, 102.
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them under abusive. These actions are fraught with uncertainty in
the legal community and the CFPB should initiate rulemaking to
address the extent of the power's reach and to clarify features of
these actions that prevent them from claims of unfair and
deceptive practices.
Finally, the Bureau cannot wait for the courts to act. In
general, courts are slow. Even when they do act, courts will not
define the abusive power so long as they can rest their decision
upon the unfair or deceptive powers. 150 If the Bureau waits to act,
it is unlikely that covered entities and consumers will have any
clarity on the abusive power in the foreseeable future.
Without rulemaking, the Bureau's practice of regulation by
enforcement will only continue. This practice would serve only to
continually harm covered entities, consumers, and the legitimacy
of a Bureau fraught with claims of unconstitutionality.' 5 ' In
conclusion, rulemaking would provide all interested participants a
degree of clarity while promoting consumer and business interests.
RULEMAKING RECOMMENDATIONS
Any potential rule must satisfy certain criterion that
provides businesses the ability to prevent themselves from
engaging in abusive conduct. Such rulemaking, though, must also
grant the Bureau a degree of flexibility to continually shape and
define the standard to fulfill its statutory purposes. This section
intends to lay out a few recommendations the Bureau should take
in defining such standard but does not intend to be exhaustive as
the author does not have the requisite knowledge and expertise
that other legal scholars and the Bureau possess. Essentially, the

150
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See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
See C. Boyden Gray, Extra Icing on an Unconstitutional Cake Already

Frosted? A Constitutional Recipe for the CFPB, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1213

(2017). While this Article was pending publication, the CFPB joined in a brief
in support of certiorari as the respondent in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau. See Brief for the Respondent in Support of a Writ for Certiorari,
Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 19-7 (U.S. Sept. 17,
2019). In its brief, the Solicitor General and the CFPB argue that the structure
of the CFPB is unconstitutional because of the CFPB's for-cause removal
requirement. Given this, in Seila Law LLC, both sides are arguing against the
constitutionality of the agency. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on
October 18, 2019. If the Supreme Court rules that the CFPB is
unconstitutional then the abusive question no longer needs addressing
because the CFPB will not exist. Time will tell.
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Bureau must rein in its abusive power and define its scope;
however, such rule must retain a degree of broadness that allows
the Bureau to protect consumers from harm. It is time to begin
scouring the waters to make it clean.
First, any potential rule, at a minimum, must distinguish
abusive allegations from those under the unfair and deceptive
powers. There is significant case law describing unfair and
deceptive conduct; therefore, (ideally) covered entities should
know the types of conduct prohibited under these powers. The
proponents of the irrelevant view argue that because the Bureau
always enforces abusive allegations along with unfair or deceptive
practices, the abusive standard is meaningless.1 52 By clearly stating
the differences between abusive and the other powers, the Bureau
would provide needed clarity to the definition. Thus, any potential
rule must define the scope and extent of the abusive power as well
as distinguish that power from the prohibition on unfair and
deceptive practices.
Second, any potential rule should provide examples of
conduct that does not constitute an abusive practice. This would
allow businesses to engage in a compare-and-contrast analysis.
Importantly, the CFPB must clearly state: "This list is not
exhaustive." A non-exhaustive list of examples of conduct that is,
and is not, abusive would highly benefit businesses and consumers
alike. This information would benefit businesses by providing
them examples so that they can compare their practice to the stated
examples. Such a list of examples would allow a business to engage
in a compare-and-contrast analysis to determine for itself whether
its practices are abusive. Further, consumers would benefit
because a non-exhaustive list would merely function as suggestions
to businesses of conduct to avoid. The Bureau would retain a
degree of flexibility under a non-exhaustive list allowing it to
utilize its power to protect consumers from abusive conduct. If a
business engages in a compare-and-contrast analysis and
incorrectly determines that their conduct is not abusive, the
Bureau may then bring an abusive allegation to enjoin the business
from continuing the practice. Thus, a rule that provides examples
of non-abusive and abusive acts or practices would promote the
interests of all individuals and businesses in the financial services
industry without the Bureau having to continue to define the
abusive standard through real-world examples of enforcement.
Finally, any potential rulemaking must weigh the interests
152
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of covered persons against the interests of the consumer. While the
statutory definition does not mandate balancing the competing
interests, such a balancing standard would highly benefit
businesses, consumers, and the CFPB in preventing arbitrary and
capricious enforcement of the standard. On one hand, the CFPB
must give businesses the freedom of innovation and the ability to
create new financial products and services that would advance the
financial industry and not "chill innovation and the introduction
of new products."1 5 3 On the other hand, any potential rule must
retain a degree of flexibility allowing the Bureau to fulfill its
purpose of "ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for
consumer financial products and services and that markets for
consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and
competitive."1 5 4 The CFPB should look to balance business
interests against consumer interests when deciding whether to
declare an act abusive in any rulemaking. Any rule, though, should
always grant initial presumptive weight in favor of the consumer.
If any doubt arises whether an act or practice is abusive or not, the
Bureau should give greater weight to the consumer's interest and
declare the covered entity's practice as abusive. Weighing such
competing interests would provide the Bureau the flexibility it
requires to fulfill its purpose while giving the financial industry the
space it needs to grow and flourish.
Conclusively, a proposed rule that distinguishes abusive
from unfair and deceptive conduct, provides examples of abusive
conduct, and one that weighs the covered entity's interests against
the more important consumer interest would give clarity to
covered entities that would provide them a basis to avoid engaging
in abusive practices. Further, such a rule under the abusive power
would give consumers the ability to avoid entities engaged in
abusive conduct, thereby, ensuring that only non-abusive practices
may flourish. Any rulemaking must provide direction; however, it
should not grant businesses free-range to engage in harmful
consumer activities. With the appropriate resources, the CFPB
should engage in rulemaking because greater clarity would benefit
consumers and businesses alike.
CONCLUSION
In late-2018, acting CFPB Director Mulvaney announced
153
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his intent to request comments for information regarding potential
rulemaking concerning the prohibition on unfair, deceptive, and
abusive acts or practices. 5 5 It is unclear whether Mulvaney's
successor, current CFPB Director Kraninger, will continue to
drive towards the initiation of rulemaking to clarify the abusive
power.15 6 This Article has shown that an analysis of the Bureau's
actions under the abusive power is difficult to characterize,
constantly overlapping with the other UDAAP prongs (especially
the deceptive prong), and is confusing. The abusive power must
mean something, but legal scholars are uncertain of the scope of
that power as well as the distinguishing characteristics that
separate it from the unfair and deceptive powers. The Bureau
must engage in rulemaking to define these contours granting
covered entities some clarity. In drafting a rule, the Bureau should
distinguish abusive from the other UDAAP prongs while
supplying businesses the clarity necessary to prevent themselves
from engaging in such conduct. Without further clarity on the
topic, the Bureau's practice of regulation by enforcement will
continue to puzzle the financial industry causing continual harm
toward businesses and consumers alike. This era of regulation by
enforcement must end.
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Lydia Beyoud & Evan Weinberger, CFPB Chief Touts Prevention of

Consumer Harm Over Enforcement, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 17, 2019, 11:42

AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ (search article title). Although the
CFPB's action against Certified Forensic Loan Auditors shows the Kraninger
administration's willingness to use the abusive power, an issue remains on
whether she will actively pursue rulemaking to clarify or limit the power.

